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We test the hypothesis that higher economic development is associated with lower trade costs. 
Using different methods to control for multilateral resistance, we apply two alternative gravity 
equations (GE). In the first, we estimate total exports from 103 Italian provinces to 188 countries 
over the period 1995-2004. In the second, we estimate sectoral exports and then construct provincial 
trade cost elasticities. Italian provinces are heterogeneous with respect to trade costs. The two 
versions of GE are qualitatively the same but quantitatively different suggesting that other factors 
than trade costs are at play, possibly agglomeration externalities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we test the hypothesis that trade costs (TCs) are negatively related to the degree of 
economic development. To motivate our hypothesis we draw on the link between TCs and cross-
border trade flows and the link between TCs and spatial economic disparities.  
There is ample evidence that TCs play an important role in international trade. A decline in 
international transportation costs, a component of TCs, is a likely cause underlying the sharp rise of 
world trade relative to world output that has occurred over the last fifty years (Hummels, 2007). 
Transportation costs rise with distance and, consequently, close countries tend to trade more than 
distant countries. But there is more than transportation in distance. Common language (Helliwell, 
1999; Hutchinson, 2002), common colonial roots (Rauch 1999), shared religion (Kang and 
Fratianni, 2006), immigrant links to the home country (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998) or more 
generally ethnic networks (Rauch and Trindade, 2001), and similarity in economic development 
(Fratianni and Kang, 2006) are trade-enhancing characteristics that counteract transportation costs. 
Beyond culture, cross-border trade is influenced by institutions such as regional trade agreements 
(Carrère, 2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) and common money (Rose, 2000; Rose and van 
Wincoop, 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2002). Last but not least, national borders are a big impediment 
to trade (McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 1998; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Chen, 2004). In 
their extensive survey, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004, 691-2; AvW henceforth) estimate that 
TCs represent the equivalent of a 170 percent ad-valorem tax barrier to trade, of which 21 percent 
attributable to transportation costs, 44 percent to border-related impediments, and 55 percent to 
distribution costs. In sum, TCs are large and complex. An often cited paper by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000) argues that TCs are the common cause to six major puzzles in international 
macroeconomics.  
  TCs are also critical in affecting the location of production facilities. Krugman (1991), the 
leader of the ‘new economic geography’, develops a core-periphery model that hinges critically on 
the interaction of transportation costs with scale economies in production. The model features a   3
sector, agriculture, with constant returns to scale and an immobile factor of production, land, and 
another sector, manufacturing, with increasing returns to scale and a mobile factor, labor. Pecuniary 
spillovers trigger a “circular causation” process whereby manufacturing tends to concentrate in 
locations with large markets that, in turn, lead to more concentration because those locations enjoy 
lower effective prices and attract mobile labor. The outcome is the endogenous formation of a richer 
industrial core and a poorer agricultural periphery, or more generally regional economic differences. 
The income differences result from differences in prices, with workers in the core enjoying higher 
real wages than in the periphery. Agglomeration accentuates as transportation costs decline, giving 
more incentive to footloose manufacturing to relocate. Agglomeration can also arise through cost 
and demand linkages stemming from firms using intermediate goods (Venables, 1996) or through 
innovation (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001). Regional economic development is a path-dependent 
process. Economic geographers agree with this conclusion, but have been critical of the ‘new 
economic geography’ for not specifying the nature of this path dependence, especially in terms of 
local institutions and social structures (Martin and Sunley, 1996, 286). 
  At the empirical level, economic historians have pointed out the economic dominance of 
medieval Italian city-states like Venice, Genoa and Florence, of Antwerp in the first half of the 16
th 
century, and of Amsterdam and London for much of the 18
th century (Braudel, 1992; Kindleberger, 
1996). There is also historical evidence that economic growth is associated with urbanization, 
spatial disparities and rising income inequality (Kuznets, 1966). Spatial disparities are also evident 
today in fast growing emerging economies such as Mexico, where the manufacturing center is 
located along the border with the United States, in China, where its center is in the coastal 
provinces, and in India, where its center is in the southern states (Venables, 2005, 3).  
  The posited negative correlation between development and TCs is a natural extension of the 
core-periphery model. The core (or cores) attracts firms and labor from the periphery (or 
peripheries) because it enjoys higher productivity, including sectors such as information services 
and distribution that are so important for international trade. The core also benefits from better   4
infrastructure and public administration, which tend to be positively correlated with development. 
Simply put, it is cheaper to run business in the cores. We test our hypothesis by estimating bilateral 
trade flows from the viewpoint of an individual country that shares common culture and national 
institutions but is heterogeneous with respect to economic development. Italy, a country known for 
its North-South divide, is a natural candidate. This divide goes back to the very beginning of the 
nation and persists to these days despite large government transfers to the South (Mezzogiorno) over 
the last fifty years. Much has been written on the subject but space permits only a few references.
1 
Lutz (1962) was among the first to analyze in depth the Italian dual economy, which she found to 
exist not only geographically, but also across industries. The literature has gone beyond the North-
South characterization. For example, Bagnasco (1977) identifies three distinct economic areas in 
Italy: the old capital-intensive North-West (First Italy), the agricultural and backward South 
(Second Italy), and the newer North-East with parts of the Center (Third Italy). Third Italy, 
furthermore, is replete with dynamic small and medium size firms that outsource production and are 
located in industrial districts (Brusco, 1990). These districts, in turn, are distinctive in their 
development paths, local institutions, and manners to generate externalities (Becattini, 1990 and 
2007).
2 In sum, regional economic development is heterogeneous. 
  Our research strategy is to estimate gravity equations (GE) using bilateral trade between 103 
Italian provinces and partner countries imposing the strong assumption that each province is 
distinctive only in its degree of economic development. The implication is that the elasticity of 
exports with respect to provincial TCs (simply, TC elasticity), our measure of TCs, is negatively 
related to provincial per-capita income, our synthetic measure of economic development. In Section 
II, we discuss the general form of GE in the presence of multilateral TCs. In Section III, we 
formulate two alternative models, a top-down GE and a bottom-up GE. Section IV is devoted to 
data. Findings are analyzed in Section V. Conclusions are drawn in the last section.  
  
                                                 
1 JSTOR lists 470 entries in economics journals under the label of Mezzogiorno. 
2 Markusen (1996) discusses different types of  industrial districts (agglomeration).   5
II. THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COSTS 
In a well-known paper, McCallum (1995) applied a GE to 1988 exports and imports among ten 
Canadian provinces and thirty U.S. states and found that inter-provincial trade was approximately 
twenty times larger than trade between provinces and states; in essence, the US-Canadian border is 
very thick. AvW (2003) criticized McCallum’s findings mostly for ignoring multilateral TCs. They 
argue that general-equilibrium considerations dictate that trade flows from region i to region j 
depend, among other factors, not only on bilateral TCs but also on multilateral ones.
3 When 
multilateral costs rise relative to bilateral costs, trade flows rise between i and j. These authors 






















x   ,       ( 1 )  
where x = exports from i to j, y = nominal income, t = bilateral TC factor, P = multilateral TC factor 
(i.e., consumer price index), σ = elasticity of substitution among goods, and i, j, and W indicate, 
respectively, exporter country, importer country and the world. Assuming that tij is a function of 
bilateral distance and one plus the tariff-equivalent bilateral border barrier, AvW estimate with 
nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations on cross-section data. Their main result 
is that borders reduce trade in the range of 20 to 50 percent, that is much less than the border found 
by McCallum. 
  The AvW estimation procedure is rather cumbersome and other authors have sought simpler 
alternatives. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) obtain virtually identical results with bonus vetus (good 
old) OLS using a first-order log-linear Taylor series expansion to approximate multilateral 
resistance with appropriate exogenous variables captured by country fixed effects. Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006) take a broader look at the issue and identify three estimation errors with GEs, 
stemming primarily from multilateral trade factors. To each error the authors assign prizes in the 
                                                 
3 The immediate predecessor of Anderson and van Wincoop is Anderson (1979). Other theoretical foundations of GE 
are provided by Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1998), Helpman (1987), and Haveman and Hummels (2004).   6
form of Olympic medals. The bronze medal goes for using real GDPs, as opposed to nominal 
GDPs. The multilateral trade factors are not well identified and the model errors fail to be 
orthogonal to the regressors, with the consequence that the OLS estimator is asymptotically 
downward biased.
4 The silver medal, assigned for a more serious error, goes for employing two-
way bilateral trade. Since the GE is a modified expenditure function with a market-clearing 
condition, the theory explains only one-way bilateral trade and not two-way trade. This error leads 
to an overestimate of bilateral trade and larger error variance, which is particularly severe in panel 
data. Finally, the gold medal goes for omitting altogether the multilateral resistance factor. 
Following Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Feenstra (2003), and Cheng and Wall (2003), Baldwin 
and Taglioni propose country dummies in cross-section data and country-pair fixed effects in panel 
data to solve the gold medal error.
 However, country-pair dummies (simply, pair dummies) are 
time-invariant and consequently can only in part resolve the gold medal error; serial correlation 
remains. It should be added that pair dummies capture all fixed effects, including distance elasticity, 
making it impossible to distinguish among parameters of various time-invariant variables. The 
alternative is provided by Carrère (2006) who shows the merit of modelling pair dummies as 
random variables. In sum, employing random pair dummies we can estimate the impact of distance 
on trade and avoid receiving the gold medal. 
 
 
III. TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP GRAVITY EQUATIONS 
For our strategy we propose two GEs, a top-down and a bottom-up version. In the top-down GE, 
distance elasticity is estimated directly for each of the 103 Italian provinces. In addition, border 
elasticity is estimated to be the same for those provinces that are adjacent to foreign countries. The 
sum of distance and border elasticities defines province-specific TC elasticity, which is then 
correlated with provincial per-capita income to see whether there is an inverse relationship between 
TCs and economic development. The other factors are common to all provinces. In the bottom-up 
                                                 
4 Other problems arise also from differences among price deflators (traded and non-traded goods) and price indices of  
traded goods.    7
GE, provincial distance elasticity is constructed as the weighted average of sectoral export distance 
elasticities. We do it by first estimating distance elasticities for all export sectors under the 
restriction that these elasticities are common to all provinces. Then, we construct provincial 
distance elasticities as the weighted average of sectoral export distance elasticities, where the 
weights are given by shares of provincial sectoral exports. Border elasticity is then added to 
distance elasticity to obtain the bottom-up TC elasticity. The two methods should yield similar 
results in the absence of co-products or residuals generated, among other things, either by 
agglomeration externalities or by congestion costs. If positive externalities prevail we would expect 
the algebraic value of TC elasticities to be larger in the top-down GE than in the bottom-up GE; the 
reverse would hold if congestion costs prevail. 
Overall GE 
Define TCs of the k
th product exported by the i
th Italian province to the j
th country as follows (for 
similar specification, see Carrère (2006)):  
] [ 4 3 2 1 0 ijk jkt jkt jkt BORDER MONEY InterRTA RTA
ij ijkt e d t
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ + + + ⋅ = ,   (2) 
where dij is bilateral distance, RTA (InterRTA) is a dummy that assumes 1 when i and j belong to the 
same (different) regional trade agreement, MONEY and BORDER are dummies that assume 1 when 
i and j share the same money or a land border. Institutional and cultural factors such as common 
language, colonial relationships and immigrant links are irrelevant and have been omitted.
5 RTA, 
InterRTA, and MONEY are relevant but are common to all provinces; hence, we drop subscript i.  
BORDER is also relevant but affects only some Northern provinces; hence, subscript i has been 
retained while t has been dropped because this variable is time-invariant over the period. As to the 
signs of the coefficients, ρ0  is positive and ρ3 and ρ4 are negative. The signs of ρ1 and ρ2, instead, 
                                                 
5 Italian, as the majority’s language, is only spoken in Italy. Catholicism is the prevalent religion. Colonial relationships 
with former colonies Libya, Somalia and Eritrea were too short lived to be of any relevance. Emigrants’ relationships 
are primarily with the home country. Furthermore, these relationships have diminished over time and are captured in 
our model by country fixed effects.   8
depend on whether the RTA is trade creating or trade diverting. If the RTA is trade creating, both ρ1 
and ρ2 are negative; if the RTA is trade diverting ρ1 is negative but ρ2 is positive (Carrère, 2006). 
  Substituting (2) in (1) we obtain a testable GE that is similar to AvW’s (2003) equation 19:  
ijkt
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σ σ − − =
1 1 ln jkt ikt
W
t P P y A  is the multilateral TC factor and Zf is the set of three TCs that are 
common to all provinces plus one TC that is common to Northern provinces adjacent to other 
countries (Z1=RTA,  Z2=InterRTA,  Z3=MONEY and Z4=BORDER). Province-sensitive distance 
elasticity  0 0 ) 1 ( ρ σ β − =  is negative since the elasticity of substitution σ is larger than unity; the 
four semi-elasticities  f f ρ σ β ) 1 ( − =  are positive, except for β2 < 0 when the RTA is trade 
diverting;  ijt t ijt u ε μ + = , where μt is a year dummy and εijt is an idiosyncratic error.  
Top-down GE 
 In the top-down GE, we modify general specification (3) as follows. The left-hand side variable is 
total exports by the province (denoted with “.” in place of the k subscript) and on the right-hand side 
distance is replaced with the interaction of distance with provincial dummies:  
t ij
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t ij f f
I
i





, 0 . . . ln ) ( ln ln ln + + + + + = ∑ ∑
= =
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where I is the number of provinces and δ(i) is a province dummy. Province-specific TC elasticities 
are: 
βS,i = β0,i + β4,i *  ij BORDER ,         
where  ij BORDER  is the frequency of common-land border trade in total trade of province i.
6 Mean-
adjusted βS,i are then regressed on average per-capita income of province i, Yi/Ni, to see whether 
they are an increasing function of economic development: 
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  Our methodology is closer to the “bonus vetus OLS” of Baier and Bergrstrand than to the 
nonlinear least square estimation of AvW. However, we avoid receiving any medals in the Baldwin-
Taglioni mistake race. With respect to the gold medal, we control for multilateral resistance using 
(a) Feenstra’s method of country fixed effects, (b) Carrère’s method of country pair random effects 
and (c) combined Feenstra-Carrère’s method of country fixed effects and country pair random 
effects. Method (c) is the best one because it considers all time-invariant specific effects of 
multilateral resistance. Method (b) is second best because it captures the bulk of the specific effects, 
although is less consistent than (c). Method (a) is the least desirable because it controls only for 
country effects, although it is better than a pure OLS since the latter fails to control for any specific 
effects. We avoid the silver medal because our dependent variable are exports and not two-way 
flows. Finally, we avoid the bronze medal because we employ nominal GDP instead of real GDP.  
Bottom-up GE 
In the bottom-up model, we first estimate sectoral distance elasticities under the restriction that 
these elasticities are common to all provinces; the restriction is imposed by data availability. We 
then calculate provincial distance elasticities as the weighted average of sectoral export distance 
elasticities, where the weights are given by the average shares of provincial sectoral exports. 
Distance in (3) is replaced by the interaction of distance with sectoral dummies. Coefficient β0 
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The numerator measures the number of export flows from the i
th province to adjacent partner countries and the 
denominator the number of flows of the i
th province to all partner countries.   10
where K is the number of sectors and δ(k) is a sector dummy. This approach is similar to the one 
adopted for provinces in the top-down model. Equations (5), like equation (4), is estimated with the 
(a), (b) and (c) methods. 
The construction of provincial TC elasticities is done as follows. First, we estimate sectoral 
distance elasticities from pooled provincial data. Second, we construct yearly provincial distance 
elasticity as the weighted average of sectoral distance elasticities. Third, we compute the average 
provincial distance elasticity over the sample period.
7 We then add to distance elasticity the border 
elasticity from the top-down model to obtain provincial TC elasticity.
8 As in the top-down model, 
average provincial TC elasticities are regressed on average per-capita provincial income. 
 
IV. DATA 
Our dataset consists of 972,754 observations covering 103 Italian provinces, 188 countries, and 21 
sectors over the period 1995-2004. The data come from different sources. Annual exports by 
province, country, and sector are from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT); they 
include all bilateral flows in excess of one euro recorded by custom offices. As already mentioned, 
we avoid the silver medal in the mistake race by considering only exports. On the other hand, we 
cannot avoid magnifying the effects of vertical specialization (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001). A bias 
is generated by re-exporting, which occurs when part of the intermediate production process is 
localized abroad. In these instances, export data overestimate the true but unknown value of exports 
(AvW, 2004). We eliminate sector “Ships and aircrafts, etc.” because it lacks a specific destination 
and exports to politically undefined areas (e.g., Antarctica) or remote parts of a country (e.g., 
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In other words, provincial distance elasticity is a double mean of (weighted) sectoral and time coefficients. 
8 The estimate of BORDER in Table 4 refers to export sectors and not to provinces.   11
Denmark’s Greenland). ISTAT is also the source of provincial population and income, the latter 
measured as the sum of value added in agriculture, industry and service except the public sector and 
financial services.  
Country income and population come from the World Development Indicators 2007 (WDI) of 
the World Bank. We lose some records in merging the two datasets because of the mismatching 
between ISTAT export destination and WDI country definition (e.g., Timor-Leste). We lose records 
because income is not reported for some countries (e.g., Brunei and Cuba). These inevitable 
trimmings, however, are of little consequence for the final research outcome. Variable dij is 
measured as the kilometric geodesic distance between province i‘s capital and country j’s capital.
 9 
Data on provincial latitude and longitude are provided by the official sites of each province; data on 
capitals’ latitude and longitude are from the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency.   
As to institutional factors, we define 11 separate RTAs, with year of entry and exit of each 
member.
10 Italy is a member of the European Union and when a province trades with a country that 
is a member of another RTA, the InterRTA dummy is equal to one. Information on common money, 
the euro, comes from the European Commission.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our dataset. Average provincial income is $11.3 billion 
(Panel A) vs. an average country income of $168.3 billion (Panel B).
11 15.5 percent of Italian 
provinces have a common land border with foreign countries. 7.1 percent of provincial trade flows 
go to members of the European Union, 3.2 percent to countries that share the same currency (the 
euro), and 28 percent to countries affiliated with other RTAs. Panel C gives descriptive statistics in 
relation to aggregate provincial exports (top-down dataset) and Panel D in relation to the 21 
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where the average earth radius r is 6,371 km, acos(x) is the radian value of the arc-cosine of x, i is the province, j is the 
country, and lat and lon indicate respectively latitude and longitude. The maximum error between real and geodesic 
distance is less than 20 km. 
10 They are European Union, U.S-IS, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZCERTA, CACM, MECOSUR, ASEAN, 
SPARTECA, and ANDEAN; see Oh (2006). 
11 The range from $1.3 to $154.8 billion for provinces and from $ 0.041 to $11,711.8 billion for country income (with 
respective standard deviations of $15.8 and $812.5 billion) indicates high income variability.   12
provincial export sectors (bottom-up dataset). Average incomes rise in the larger sample size 
because of the higher frequency of high-income areas, which tend to export more than low-income 
areas. The same occurs for the number of trade relations among RTA members as a proportion of 
maximum bilateral relations and for the share of common money countries. The incidence of 
common border loses relative to other institutional factors. Average distance falls from 5,231 km in 
Panel C to 4,451 in Panel D suggesting that near countries import more sectors than distant 
countries. Panel D also reports difference-of-mean and Wilcoxon tests with respect to Panel C that 
indicate that the top-down and the bottom-up datasets are similar. The Kolmogorv-Smirnov test 
refutes at the 99 percent confidence level the null hypothesis that the distribution of Panel C differs 
from that of Panel D, except for border (not reported).  
Average provincial exports are $19.5 billion in the top-down dataset and $2.6 billion in the 
bottom-up dataset. There is no bias selection because ISTAT reports all export values. Figure 1 
shows that provincial exports from the top-down dataset (130,321 observations) have a profile 
consistent with a log-normal distribution. In the GE the normality of the dependent variable is 
critical because the estimations are basically OLS. A log-normal distribution also emerges from the 
bottom-up dataset (972,754 observations); see Figure 2. In sum, normality appears to be robust to 
data aggregation.  
Finally, we report on the zero-values of the bilateral trade flow matrix. Complete 
specialization models, such as AvW’s, imply that this matrix be full. The question is at what level 
of aggregation one should expect a relatively full matrix. Haveman and Hummels (2004, 211) 
report a 73 percent matrix fullness at the four-digit SITC level. Although our level of disaggregation 
is much shallower than the four-digit SITC category, we expect more zeros because of territorial 
disaggregation.
12 With 972,754 actual observations against a potential number of 4,066,440 
observations, our trade matrix has a 24 percent average fullness. Table 2 shows the distribution of 
fullness by sector. Relative large numbers in the table reflect comparative advantage and diffuse 
                                                 
12 The Italian classification is called ATECO and is very similar to the international ISIC classification.   13
localization of production. Typical Italian products such as “Machinery and Equipment” and 
“Textiles and Textile Products” are 6 to 11 times fuller than sectors with low comparative 




Table 3 presents the results of the top-down model. Our panel estimates use a cluster correction for 
the province-country pair and robust standard errors. The former reduces potential pair serial 
correlation and the latter corrects for potential heteroschedasticity. We would have also employed 
the Hausman (1978) specification test to compare fixed with random effects but we could not do it 
because of the high number of groups (16,629). Instead, we relied on the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrange-Multiplier (1979, BPLM for short) test, which rejects the null hypothesis of zero-variance 
implied by the fixed effect model in favor of the alternative random effect model. 
Provincial and country income elasticities have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant even if they are individually different from one, a result that is in contrast with theory 
but accords with much of the empirical literature. The RTA semi-elasticity is statistically positive  in 
two out of the three methods but the size is very sensitive to the methodology.
13 The negative 
InterRTA semi-elasticity in two out of the three methods suggests trade diversion, but the size, like 
for the RTA coefficient, is very sensitive to the chosen methodology. The MONEY semi-elasticity is 
statistically positive but of low economic impact.
14 The BORDER semi-elasticity is statistically 
positive, stable through the different methods, and economically relevant.
15 The 103 distance 
elasticities interacting with provinces are all negative and statistically very significant, individually 
                                                 
13 We recall that method (a) uses country fixed effects, method (b) country pair random effects, and method (c) country 
fixed effects and country pair random effects. All methods use year dummies. 
14 For example, the exponent of 0.061 (the estimated MONEY coefficient under method (c)) is 1.06, suggesting that  
common money raises exports by 6 percent. The effects of common money on trade reported by Rose (2000), Rose and 
van Wincoop (2001), and Frankel and Rose (2002) are much higher. There is a considerable controversy on this subject.  
15 For example, the exponent of 0.507 (the estimated BORDER coefficient under method (c)) means that a common 
border raises exports by 66 percent.   14
as well as jointly. The average distance elasticity is -1.268 under method (a), -1.037 under method 
(b), and -1.388 under method (c). Variability across provinces is high, ranging from a minimum of 
738 . 1 −  for Cosenza, in the South, under method (c) to a maximum of  840 . 0 −  for Vercelli, in the 
North, under method (b). Clearly, there is more than transportation in distance. Finally, the 
regressions explain a great portion of the export variance and confirm the empirical robustness of 
the GE also at a highly disaggregated level.  
The impact of TCs on exports is the sum of distance, BORDER,  RTA,  InterRTA, and 
MONEY elasticities, with the last three being common to all Italian provinces. In our model, this 
impact for, say, Vercelli, using method (b), is the sum of its own distance elasticity, -0.840, its own  
BORDER elasticity, 0.0008, and the three common (to all provinces) elasticities that add up to 
0.0565; that is, -0.7828. For Cosenza, TC elasticity, using method (c), is the sum of its own distance 
elasticity, -1.738, plus the three common elasticities that add up to -0.2163; that is,  9543 . 1 − .
16 
Naturally, in comparing provinces, the common TCs drop out and one is left with the sum of  
distance and border elasticities. Distance elasticity accounts, on average, for about 99 percent of 
province-specific TCs. 
  To test our main hypothesis, we regress mean-adjusted provincial TC elasticities on average 
provincial per-capita income. We report scatter plots, in the [βS,i -  i S, β , Yi/Ni] space, and fitted lines 
for each of the three methods in the top part of Figure 3; estimation results are shown in Table 5. 
The fitted lines are positive and statistically very significant: provinces with lower (i.e., more 
negative) than average TC elasticities, such as Cosenza, are associated with lower per-capita 
income, while provinces with higher (i.e., less negative) than average TC elasticities, such as 
Vercelli, are associated with higher per-capita income.
17 In essence, developing provinces face 
higher TCs than developed provinces.  
Bottom-up model  
                                                 
16 For Cosenza, BORDER is zero and the RTA coefficient is not statistically different from zero. 
17 While the slope coefficients of the graphs appear low (ranging from 0.0194 to 0.0223), it should be remembered that 
we correlate a pure number like elasticity with a level variable like per-capita income.   15
We move now to the bottom-up model to see whether we can mimic provincial TC elasticities. 
Table 4 presents results of sector regressions; cf. equation (5). We recall that provincial TC 
elasticities are the sum of provincial distance elasticities, obtained by aggregating sectoral distance 
elasticities, and provincial border elasticities obtained from the top-down model. 
The number of observations rises dramatically to 972,754, making it computationally 
impossible to estimate the model under method (c). To get some results, we trim the dataset 
eliminating export values below $100,000 and reduce the number of observations to 462,211 under 
method (c). Again, we cannot perform the Hausman specification test and rely on BPLM to select 
method (b) as our best. Income elasticity is not statistically different from one for Italian provinces 
under methods (a) and (b) but is different from one for countries. TC variables show up statistically 
significant. The RTA semi-elasticity suggests that the European Union has been a hindrance to trade 
for its members. We do not hold much credence to this result that we attribute to country fixed or 
pair random effects that absorb a great deal of the RTA effects. The InterRTA semi-elasticity is 
negative under method (a) and positive under method (b); again, we suspect that country fixed or 
pair random effects are driving these changes. The MONEY semi-elasticity is positive, economically 
small, and relatively stable across methods. The BORDER semi-elasticity rises from method (a) to 
method (b) and then falls again under method (c). All 21 sector distance elasticities are negative and 
very statistically significant, individually as well as jointly. Their variability is higher than 
provincial distance elasticities, as one would expect: the range is from a minimum of -2.39 of 
“Coal, Lignite, Peat, etc.” under method (a), to a maximum of -0.47 for “Machinery, etc.” under 
method (b). The explained variance of the regressions is lower than in Table 3.  
  To test our main hypothesis, we proceed exactly as in the top-down model. The bottom 
portion of Figure 3 shows the scatter plots and the fitted lines of the relationship between mean-
adjusted provincial TC elasticities and provincial per-capita income. Qualitatively, we confirm what 
we obtained in the top-down model. However, the top-down model provides a tighter fit than the 
bottom-up model, as evidenced by the smaller values of the slopes of the latter. Clearly, something   16
is missing in provincial TC elasticities from the bottom-up model: a sort of residual agglomeration 
factor that can be thought of as the equivalent of total productivity factor in neoclassical production 
functions. Agglomeration externalities, level and quality of the infrastructure and quality of public-
sector services are potential candidates to explain this residual agglomeration factor. 
We conducted two exercises to check on the robustness of the bottom-up results.
18 The first 
was to estimate equation (5) with sectoral data at the national level. In the presence of an 
aggregation problem we would expect a closer convergence between the estimates of the top-down 
model and the bottom-up model with national level data. The small improvement we find relative to 
the provincial bottom-up model suggests an aggregation problem that goes beyond the simple sum 
of provincial sectoral effects. The second was to repeat the analysis with unconstrained control 
variables: that is, estimating K regressions so as to allow the control variables to have different 
effects on the K sectors. This should be more realistic because the GE is an expenditure function 
and income elasticities are likely to differ across different goods. We conducted the second exercise 
at national and provincial level using the three methods. In brief, methods (a) and (b) applied to 
national data corroborate our hypothesis. On the other hand, random pair effects provide an 
excessively detailed specification with unconstrained control variables, and disaggregation affects 
negatively the estimation with provincial data. Some sectors generate inconsistent estimates because 
of the low number of observations and few provincial distance elasticities emerge as outliers. It is 
worth noting that the presence of outliers may work against our hypothesis; see Figure 3. 
In sum, we have marshalled a broad body of evidence in support of our hypothesis that TCs and 
economic development are inversely related in Italy. Development patterns appear to be consistent 
with the main implications of agglomeration theory: developed and richer provinces occur more 
frequently in the industrial North than in the still developing South. These patterns are shown 
visually in Figure 4, where Italian provinces are coded according to the values of the estimated 
provincial TC elasticities from the top-down model. With few exceptions, provinces in the “First 
                                                 
18 Results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.   17
Italy” (North-West) and “Third Italy” (North-East and parts of the Center) face lower TCs than 
provinces in the developing South; these results are consistent with the message of the literature on 
heterogeneous regional economic development.  
  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The key result of the paper is that economic development is associated with lower trade costs. 
Using different methods to control for multilateral resistance, we apply two alternative forms of a 
gravity equation, a top-down version and a bottom-up version, to exports from 103 Italian provinces 
to 188 countries over the period 1995-2004. Under both alternatives we fail to reject our hypothesis 
that trade costs are inversely related to economic development. We find, however, that the slope of 
provincial TC elasticities -our measure of provincial heterogeneity- with respect to provincial per-
capita income has the same sign in both models but the steepness is higher in the top-down model. 
Three possible reasons come to mind for this outcome. The first is that a country’s income is a good 
proxy of its aggregate expenditures but not of individual sectors’ expenditures, which have a higher 
variability than aggregate expenditures. The second has to do with an aggregation problem. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) show that the absolute effect of trade barriers on aggregate trade 
is larger when barriers fall than when barriers rise because trade costs are decreasing and convex in 
their components. Provincial TC elasticities from sectoral distance elasticities fail to capture this 
effect. Some evidence of this emerges from the fact that the slopes get steeper as we move from 
provincial to national level export data. The last has already been mentioned, namely the possible 
presence of an agglomeration residual factor equivalent to total factor productivity in neoclassical 
production functions. It may be tempting to surmise that the main sources of such a residual are 
differences in agglomeration externalities, in level and quality of infrastructure and in the quality of 
public-sector services. Clearly, this issue needs further study.  
  We have measured the impact of trade costs on exports as the sum of two province-specific 
elasticities, distance and border, and three other elasticities –RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY– that are   18
common to all Italian provinces. We plan, in the future, to inquire for possible asymmetric effects 
of these “common” trade costs, the conjecture being that the effects of the European Union and of 
the euro are felt differently across Italian provinces. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (millions of US dollars for Exports, Yi and Yj) 
   Mean  (a) Median  (b) Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
Panel A 
(N=103)                      
Yi  11,315.7   6,967.2   15,809.2 1,284.0  154,822.0
Border  0.155     0     0.362 0  1
Panel B 
(N=188)                      
Yj  168,332.7   8,089.5   812,480.3 40.8  11,711,833.7
RTA  0.071   0   0.257 0  1
Inter-RTA  0.280   0   0.449 0  1
MONEY  0.032   0   0.176 0  1
BORDER  0.022     0     0.147 0  1
Panel C 
(N=130,321)                      
Exports  19.5   0.7   108.9 3x10
-6 5,238.2
Yi  13,135.2   7,848.3   17,968,2 1,284.0  154,821.9
Yj  238,517.9   18,672.6   965,930.3 40.8  11,711,833.7
Distance  5,231   4,444   3,862 69  18,932
RTA  0.104   0   0.305 0  1
Inter-RTA  0.232   0   0.422 0  1
MONEY  0.050   0   0.218 0  1
BORDER  0.001     0     0.036 0  1
Panel D 
(N=972,754)                      
Exports
 c 2.6 
***  0.1
***  18.1 1x10
-6 1,531.7
Yi
 c 16,434.0 
***  9,198.2
***  22,235.2 1,.284.0 154,821.9
Yj
 c 417,360.6 
***  60,817.2
***  1,320,683.7 40.8 11,711,833.7
Distance
 c 4.451 
***  2,641
***  3,962 69 18,932
RTA  0.183 
***  0
***  0.387 0 1
Inter-RTA  0.203 
***  0
***  0.402 0 1
MONEY  0.089 
***  0
***  0.285 0 1
BORDER  0.003 
***  0
***  0.057 0 1
Note: Panel A: statistics on provinces (i=103, j=1, k=1, t=10); Panel B: statistics on countries (i=1, j=188, 
k=1, t=10); Panel C: statistics on province-country (i=103, j=188, k=1, t=10); Panel D: statistics on 
province-country-sector (i=103, j=188, k=21, t=10). (a) Difference-of-Mean Test between Panel C and D: 
*** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.10. (b) Wilcoxon Test between Panel C and D: *** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, 
* = p<0.10. (c) Tests over the logarithmic transformation. 
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Table 2: Full cells in the trade matrix    
Sector 






Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry   0.31505371
Fish, Fishing Products   0.07920884
Coal, Lignite, Peat, Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Uranium, Thorium   0.03672795
Metal Ores, Other Mining, Quarrying Products   0.15978620
Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco   0.39478414
Textiles, Textile Products   0.41405701
Leather, Leather Products   0.30810783
Wood, Products of Wood, Cork (Except Furniture), Articles of Straw, Plaiting Materials   0.27897129
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Recorded Media, Printing Services   0.29880706
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel   0.09446395
Chemicals, Chemical Products, Man-Made Fibres   0.39609068
Rubber, Plastic Products   0.37533051
Other Non Metallic Mineral Products   0.37696757
Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal Products   0.42533051
Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.   0.51390725
Electrical and Optical Equipment   0.42727742
Transport Equipment   0.35043379
Other Manufactured Goods N.E.C.   0.39884321
Electrical Energy, Gas, Steam, Water   0.00343937
Real Estate, Renting, Business Services   0.08559182
Other Community, Social and Personal Services   0.06893720
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Table 3: Top-Down Model: Step 1 - Physical Distance interacting with Provinces. Period 1995-2004 (N=130,321) 
COEFFICIENT  (a) (b) (c)  COEFFICIENT (a) (b) (c) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  d*Massa-Carrara  -1.082 -0.877 -1.214 
Constant  -29.29 -31.79 -28.97  d*Matera  -1.310 -1.068 -1.424 
ln(Yi)  1.465 1.364 1.457  d*Messina  -1.521 -1.256 -1.621 
ln(Yj)  0.785 0.929 0.831  d*Milano  -1.235 -0.990 -1.368 
BORDER  0.583 0.760 0.507  d*Modena  -1.093 -0.875 -1.229 
RTA  1.083 0.166 -1.219  d*Napoli  -1.312 -1.077 -1.442 
inter-RTA  -0.480 0.155 -0.399  d*Novara  -1.128 -0.918 -1.263 
MONEY  0.061 0.065 0.061  d*Nuoro  -1.567 -1.297 -1.660 
d*Agrigento  -1.628 -1.370 -1.731  d*Oristano  -1.510 -1.204 -1.569 
d*Alessandria  -1.148 -0.936 -1.281  d*Padova  -1.158 -0.937 -1.291 
d*Ancona  -1.147 -0.940 -1.287  d*Palermo  -1.541 -1.280 -1.643 
d*Aosta  -1.327 -1.095 -1.440  d*Parma  -1.121 -0.910 -1.256 
d*Arezzo  -1.142 -0.930 -1.274  d*Pavia  -1.153 -0.939 -1.286 
d*Ascoli-Piceno  -1.179 -0.969 -1.316  d*Perugia  -1.279 -1.058 -1.408 
d*Asti  -1.175 -0.957 -1.297  d*Pesaro  -1.146 -0.929 -1.275 
d*Avellino  -1.296 -1.063 -1.411  d*Pescara  -1.275 -1.053 -1.398 
d*Bari  -1.366 -1.135 -1.494  d*Piacenza  -1.117 -0.907 -1.248 
d*Belluno  -1.135 -0.931 -1.275  d*Pisa  -1.183 -0.965 -1.312 
d*Benevento  -1.547 -1.258 -1.621  d*Pistoia  -1.132 -0.922 -1.261 
d*Bergamo  -1.167 -0.948 -1.306  d*Pordenone  -1.098 -0.886 -1.230 
d*Biella  -1.159 -0.956 -1.296  d*Potenza  -1.390 -1.151 -1.504 
d*Bologna  -1.164 -0.939 -1.296  d*Prato  -1.076 -0.876 -1.218 
d*Bolzano  -1.404 -1.175 -1.529  d*Ragusa  -1.522 -1.269 -1.629 
d*Brescia  -1.207 -0.987 -1.345  d*Ravenna  -1.159 -0.950 -1.294 
d*Brindisi  -1.355 -1.109 -1.464  d*Reggio-Calabria  -1.551 -1.293 -1.648 
d*Cagliari  -1.373 -1.126 -1.492  d*Reggio-Emilia  -1.077 -0.860 -1.210 
d*Caltanisetta  -1.444 -1.185 -1.545  d*Rieti  -1.271 -1.016 -1.361 
d*Campobasso  -1.341 -1.101 -1.449  d*Rimini  -1.236 -1.017 -1.363 
d*Caserta  -1.292 -1.063 -1.415  d*Roma  -1.427 -1.181 -1.555 
d*Catania  -1.463 -1.217 -1.574  d*Rovigo  -1.193 -0.968 -1.312 
d*Catanzaro  -1.595 -1.311 -1.672  d*Salerno  -1.222 -0.998 -1.352 
d*Chieti  -1.201 -0.977 -1.324  d*Sassari  -1.478 -1.239 -1.596 
d*Como  -1.136 -0.921 -1.271  d*Savona  -1.284 -1.046 -1.397 
d*Cosenza  -1.647 -1.373 -1.738  d*Siena  -1.131 -0.914 -1.254 
d*Cremona  -1.186 -0.972 -1.319  d*Siracusa  -1.189 -0.952 -1.305 
d*Crotone  -1.477 -1.218 -1.569  d*Sondrio  -1.269 -1.036 -1.386 
d*Cuneo  -1.177 -0.959 -1.309  d*Taranto  -1.365 -1.123 -1.485 
d*Enna  -1.525 -1.257 -1.617  d*Teramo  -1.164 -0.951 -1.293 
d*Ferrara  -1.182 -0.965 -1.311  d*Terni  -1.217 -0.994 -1.338 
d*Firenze  -1.222 -1.000 -1.356  d*Torino  -1.277 -1.049 -1.415 
d*Foggia  -1.533 -1.272 -1.630  d*Trapani  -1.416 -1.168 -1.522 
d*Forlì  -1.160 -0.946 -1.293  d*Trento  -1.277 -1.059 -1.409 
d*Frosinone  -1.240 -1.009 -1.357  d*Treviso  -1.139 -0.915 -1.271 
d*Genova  -1.251 -1.025 -1.382  d*Trieste  -1.204 -0.978 -1.326 
d*Gorizia  -1.148 -0.930 -1.271  d*Udine  -1.196 -0.984 -1.335 
d*Grosseto  -1.348 -1.093 -1.443  d*Varese  -1.132 -0.910 -1.264 
d*Imperia  -1.352 -1.119 -1.468  d*Venezia  -1.229 -1.008 -1.363 
d*Isernia  -1.121 -0.906 -1.250  d*Verbania  -1.280 -1.062 -1.406 
d*LaSpezia  -1.220 -0.997 -1.339  d*Vercelli  -1.051 -0.840 -1.177 
d*L'Aquila  -1.319 -1.082 -1.433  d*Verona  -1.176 -0.953 -1.307 
d*Latina  -1.194 -0.973 -1.324  d*Vibo-Valentia  -1.488 -1.199 -1.550 
d*Lecce  -1.386 -1.149 -1.502  d*Vicenza  -1.133 -0.910 -1.266 
d*Lecco  -1.160 -0.950 -1.294  d*Viterbo  -1.289 -1.054 -1.400 
d*Livorno  -1.235 -1.005 -1.354  Observations 130,321  130,321  130,321 
d*Lodi  -1.222 -1.000 -1.345  Number of pair    16,629  16,629 
d*Lucca  -1.135 -0.912 -1.258  R
2  0.776 0.724 0.774 
d*Macerata  -1.167 -0.963 -1.307  F-test  480.4 76,148  129,281 
d*Mantova  -1.130 -0.917 -1.264  Prob>F  0 0 0 
NOTE: Robust standard errors: no-asterisk p<0.01; * p<0.05; ** p<0.1; *** p>0.1. Cluster correction on pairs. See text for (a), (b), (c) methods.   24
 
Table 4: Bottom-Up Model: Step 1 - Physical Distance interacting with Sectors. Period 1995-2004 
   Provincial Level  
COEFFICIENT (a)  (b)  (c)
□
 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  -13.45 -17.53  -0.315*** 
ln(Yi)  1.051 0.903  0.46 
ln(Yj)  0.627 0.536 0.442 
BORDER  0.344** 1.505  0.497 
RTA  -2.303 -0.056*** -2.657 
inter-RTA  -0.42 0.123  -0.047*** 
MONEY  0.108 0.082  0.0566 
d*Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry  -1.821  -0.802  -0.91 
d*Fish, Fishing Products  -2.198 -1.203 -1.047 
d*Coal, Lignite, Peat, Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Uranium, Thorium  -2.39  -1.43  -0.933 
d*Metal Ores, Other Mining, Quarrying Products  -1.978  -0.979  -1.014 
d*Food Products, Beverages, Tobacco  -1.648  -0.621  -0.817 
d*Textiles, Textile Products  -1.629 -0.604 -0.769 
d*Leather, Leather Products  -1.715 -0.7 -0.824 
d*Wood, Products of Wood, Cork (Except Furniture), Articles of Straw, Plaiting Materials  -1.905  -0.901  -0.99 
d*Pulp. Paper, Paper Products, Recorded Media, Printing Services  -1.792  -0.78  -0.902 
d*Coke, Refined Petroleum Products, Nuclear Fuel  -1.98  -0.998  -0.828 
d*Chemicals, Chemical Products, Man-Made Fibres  -1.602  -0.579  -0.787 
d*Rubber, Plastic Products  -1.687 -0.667 -0.857 
d*Other Non Metallic Mineral Products  -1.691  -0.671  -0.856 
d*Basic Metals, Fabricated Metal Products  -1.616  -0.593  -0.79 
d*Machinery and Equipment N.E.C.  -1.495  -0.467  -0.697 
d*Electrical and Optical Equipment  -1.633  -0.608  -0.793 
d*Transport Equipment  -1.677 -0.658 -0.804 
d*Other Manufactured Goods N.E.C.  -1.663  -0.641  -0.82 
d*Electrical Energy, Gas, Steam, Water  -2.234  -1.258  -1.016 
d*Real Estate, Renting, Business Services  -2.227  -1.254  -1.204 
d*Other Community, Social and Personal Services  -2.167  -1.174  -1.122 
Observations  972,754 972,754 462,211 
Number of pair   16,629  12,495 
R
2  0.387 0.352 0.366 
F-test  242.5 49,406  20,467 
Prob>F  0 0 0 
BPLM-Test   1,793,846  509,744 
Prob>chi2     0  0 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses: no-asterisk p<0.01; * p<0.05; ** p<0.1; *** p>0.1. Cluster correction on pairs. See text for (a), (b), 
(c) methods.
 □ Exports over 100,000 US$ for technical reasons. 
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Table 5: Relationship between TC elasticities and average provincial per-capita income. 
 Top-Down  Bottom-Up:  Provincial  Level 
COEFFICIENT (a)  (b)  (c)  (a) (b)  (c) 
Constant -0.416  -0.361  -0.368  -0.098  -0.104  -0.050 
 (0.044)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.0090) 
Yi/Ni  0.0223  0.0194  0.0197 0.0053 0.0056 0.0027 
 (0.0023)  (0.0020)  (0.0021)  (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.00047) 
Observations 103  103  103  103  103  103 
R
2 0.486  0.478  0.459  0.190  0.183  0.249 
NOTE: Yi/Ni is the average over period 1995-2004. Standard errors in parentheses: no-asterisk p<0.01; * p<0.05; ** p<0.1; *** p>0.1. See text for 
methods (a), (b), and (c).   26
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Note: Colors in the maps represent mean-adjusted provincial distance elasticities using the top-down model; see text for methods (a), (b), and (c); first and last ranges 
in the legend are larger than other ranges because they include extreme values. 
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